Duke University
Department of Religion
April 29, 1996
HTML Version: May 14, 1998
Mulamadhyamikakarika
As we shall soon see, Nagarjuna’s purpose in writing the Mulamadhyamikakarika was not to reject the traditional Buddhist teachings but to reform them. He did not intend to disavow the traditional concepts such as interdependent origination and impermanence but to show that the right view toward them is one of balanced relativism rather than dogmatic absolutism. The text is a response to the the Abidharma schools of Buddhist philosophical thought in the time of Nagarjuna, namely the Sarvastivadins and the Sautrantikas, who proceeded too far in their academic study of the dharmas. The text must be understood in light of the fact that it is attempting to refute the various claims put forth by each of these traditions.
The Sarvastivadins concluded their analysis of the dharmas with the recognition of discrete atomic elements comprising all of reality and discrete indivisible moments comprising time. However, since they were unable to put these discrete elements together in order to explain the experienced continuity of phenomena, they were forced to adopt the metaphysical concept of “self-nature” (svabhava). Since this svabhava was necessary to explain the impermanence of phenomena, it was held by the Sarvastivadins to be permanent and unchanging. Thus, the Sarvastivadins become known as substantialists for their assertion of an essential substance underlying and giving continuity to perceived reality.
The Sautrantika school, on the other hand, rejected the Sarvastivadin assertion of “self-nature,” identifying it as a carefully calculated and disguised theory of self (atman). However, they did not reject the assertions of a theory of atoms and moments, failing to see that these conceptions had “set the trap” from which the Sarvastivadins could not escape. Various schools such as the “personalists” (Pudgalavadins) and the “transmigrationists” (Samkrantivadins) developed, each with complex philosophical systems aimed at explaining the experienced continuity in the individual person. The Sautrantikas, while denying self-nature in phenomena, were forced to introduce the concept of self or person (atman, pudgala) in a human personality.
Therefore, Nagarjuna’s critique is directed at the notions of “self-existence” held by the various Abidharma schools, and thus should not be wrongly viewed as an attack on all conceptions of existence. As we shall see, Nagarjuna wishes to avoid these nihilistic conclusions as well. The Mulamadhyamikakarika is thus called “The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way” because it steers a steady course between the extremes of eternalism and nihilism.
The dialectical method of Nagarjuna is systematic and follows a cyclic strategy throughout the text. In each chapter, Nagarjuna begins by accepting the notion of own-being (svabhava) and then showing the absurdities implicit in such a “realistic” view point. His attack on these metaphysical propositions is that they do not provide the knowledge they claim to. Nagarjuna shows that they cannot possibly fulfill their promise because “words and expression-patterns are simply practical tools of human life, which in themselves, do not carry intrinsic meaning and which do not necessarily have meaning by referring to something outside the language system.”1 In this way, he consistently replaces apparently common sense notions which are in fact highly metaphysical with apparently metaphysical notions which are in fact common sense.
Gatagata pariksa
In chapter I (“Examination of Relational Condition”) Nagarjuna shows that the links between conditions and consequences are empty of inherent existence. However, one might still assert that even though the links between conditions and consequences are empty, the change represented by the arising of the consequences is real. The critique in chapter II is primarily directed at the Sautrantikas who held that what is moving is not substantially different (only temporally different) from what moved in the past. Thus, they are still asserting a substantialist claim which Nagarjuna seeks to deny.
The Sanskrit terms in chapter II have traditionally been translated (by Streng, Sprung, Kalupahana, and Garfield) in relation to motion and rest. However, Inada renders them as related to transpiring and passing away. Garfield makes the point in his commentary on chapter II that Nagarjuna most likely intends the attack on motion viewed as an inherently existent phenomenon to be a general attack on viewing change or impermanence as inherently existent. Since in chapter I Nagarjuna attacks the notion of seeing interdependent origination as inherently existent, if chapter II were extended to include change or impermanence, this would suggest that even the properties which according to Buddhist philosophy characterize all things-interdependent origination and impermanence-are not themselves inherently existent. Garfield states, “It would seem especially elegant for Nagarjuna, who is attacking the tendency to reify, to begin with the two properties most subject to reification in Buddhist philosophy, in virtue of their universal applicability to phenomena and centrality to the Buddhist metaphysical framework.”2 In light of this, I favor Inada’s choice in translation since the terms “passing away” and “transpire” include not only motion but can also be applied to change. Sprung notes that Nagarjuna’s Sanskrit terms are both spatial and temporal, inextricably.3 Unless otherwise noted, then, the translations below are from Inada.
However, to avoid awkwardness in explaining the passages to the reader, I will rely frequently on the spatial set of terms such as “motion” and “mover.” These terms are less cumbersome to use than the phrases “passing away,” “coming to pass,” etc. since the English language lacks terms which are both spatial and temporal. The reader must remember that at all times, however, the spatial terms can be extrapolated to the temporal sense of the argument in question as well. This stated, let us examine Nagarjuna’s critique of the inherent existence of that which has transpired and the process of transpiring.
1: Indeed, that which has transpired does not come to pass nor does that which has not transpired. Separated from these, the present passing away cannot be known.
Candrakirti uses the analogy of a foot walking to analyze this chapter. He says that we observe sections of the path of an object (e.g. a foot) which either 1) have been traversed or 2) have not been traversed. There is no other type of section. We do not observe a space “being” traversed. If you say that a foot spans a distance and that this is the space “being” traversed, then you must realize that a foot or any object is made up of tiny point-particles. If you restrict your analysis to any one of these particles, you will find space before it which has not been traversed and space behind it which has been traversed. There is no space that is “being” traversed, and because this holds true for all the particles from heel to toe, there is no space anywhere that is “being” traversed. Space either is or is not already traversed.
An alternative formulation of this argument is that: 1) what has moved in the past is not now moving by nature of its having moved already and 2) what has not moved is not moving by nature of its not having moved. Hence, if motion is to exist at all it must exist in the present. However, motion requires a change in position over time, and since the present has no duration, there can be no motion in the present. This refutes the claim of the Sarvastivadins that time is made up of discrete indivisible moments. For if any duration of time, no matter how short, were proposed as “the present moment,” it could always be shown that such a duration was divisible on the basis that it has a forward-looking and a rearward-looking end. The true present moment has no duration and cannot be conceived of except in relation to the past and future. Line 3 excludes the possibility of a third type of entity (one which both has and has not moved, or neither has nor has not moved) as being presently moving as such an entity is not observed to exist.
Inada cautions against the tendency to formulate the argument here as simple past, present, and future. He explains that “upon critical reading the argument centers on the idea of a past (transpired moment) and does not justify any assertion of a future in the ordinary sense.”4 He notes that in Kumarajiva’s Chinese translation, the character ch’ii occurs in his rendering of all three terms, making them “that which has transpired” (gata), “that which has not transpired” (agata), and “present passing away” (gamyamana). All these terms center on a past transpired moment.
This passage then, in denying the identity of a presently moving entity with either of the other types of entities, refutes the substantialism of the Sarvastivadins. However, one may object that a tense fallacy exists here and argue that an object that was moving in the past was then in motion. This is the idea behind the opponent’s objection in the next verse and reflects the Suatrantika perspective.
2: (The opponent contends) Where there is movement, there is passage. There is movement also in the present passing away but not in that which has transpired nor in that which has not transpired. Thus passage must reside in the present passing away.
The syllogism goes something like this: 1) Where there is movement there is passage; 2) Where there is movement there is present passing; 3) Thus, passage is in the present passing. This objection invokes the notion of a present without reference to past or future. Garfield and Sprung, upon translating the last line, say the passage must reside within the mover, that is, within the object which is presently passing. However, Inada and Kalupahana translate this line as motion existing in the present passing. This variance highlights that this passage can be interpreted either spatially (as in Garfield and Sprung) or temporally (as in Inada and Kalupahana). Again we see the intrinsic double meaning of the Sanskrit terms which allows Nagarjuna to simultaneously critique motion and impermanence. According to Sprung, Candrakirti interprets the root of these terms as referring to “reaching another point in space,” to “comprehension,” and possibly to “attainment” or “achievement” in addition. This chapter can be interpreted in these ways as well.
3: Indeed, how is it possible for the present passing away to have a coming to pass? For, it is not possible for the present passing away to be without a coming to pass.
There is a discrepancy in the final line between the Sanskrit version and the Tibetan, Japanese, and Chinese versions. Kalupahana suggests that this is a result of a scribal error, but Inada believes that it shows that a few revisions were made in later centuries. All the texts consulted have corrected the Sanskrit error in their translations.
In this verse, Nagarjuna takes the opponent’s objection and shows how it will result in unacceptable implications. If motion inherently exists and the mover inherently exists, this implies: 1) that the present movement could move or 2) that it could also not move. His argument is basically that motion and present moving are synonyms and cannot be split. For if they could be split, you would have to continue to call an ex-mover a mover since an inherently existing mover could not cease to be such.
In this verse Sprung renders the verse as, “How can movement be intelligebly attributed to what is in traverse....” In this statement, Candrakirti points out, “in traverse” can refer to either the object in traverse or to the space “in traverse” which was shown before to be nonexistent. In addition, Inada’s translation reminds us that this entire chapter inextricably relates to change as well. In the next verse, Nagarjuna will discount the first implication of the opponent’s assertion and will then pursue the second in the verse following.
4: The assertion that the present passing away has a coming to pass results in a fallacy that the former can be without the latter. However, the present passing away does come to pass.
Pursuing the first implication that the present movement can exhibit motion, Nagarjuna shows that this argument assumes that the latter is attributed to the former, and thus that they could in theory be separated if they were inherently existent. The final line of this verse saves Nagarjuna from adopting the nihilistic standpoint, for he affirms that present passing away does indeed take place. Kalupahana and Inada preserve this important point clearly in their translations. Nagarjuna is refuting here only the existence of motion and mover as inherently existent entities.
If, as the opponent proclaims, there is movement of what is in traverse as supplied by motion, then what is in traverse is devoid of motion. Only then can what is in traverse move. Garfield explains this point in a slightly different light when he says that if motion is in the mover, then non-motion could be in the mover.5 This hints at Nagarjuna’s later logical move of applying this analysis of motion to non-motion, namely rest. Here, since motion and non-motion are opposites, it follows that if a mover can sometimes have motion, it must have non-motion at the times when it does not possess motion. This would be unacceptable to Nagarjuna’s opponent. Nagarjuna then critiques the second implication of verse 3.
5: There are two aspects of coming to pass inherent in the passage of the present passing away. That is, one (which gives substance) to the present passing away and the other (which is the coming to pass itself).
This passage must be read carefully, for it is a very important concept which will appear repeatedly. If the opponent responds to verse 4 in an effort to escape relying on an essential conception of motion by stating that motion is a property of a mover only when it is moving, then it follows that motion can exist independently of and has no inextricable attachment to the mover. This necessitates two movements then: 1) the reason why we called the entity a mover in the first place is the first movement and 2) the property just described which gives the mover-so-named its motion is the second movement. For if only the former possessed a movement, it would “outrun” the property giving it motion and leave it behind. This would be unacceptable. Alternatively, the motion must move with the mover, thus producing two motions. Nagarjuna next takes up the implications of having two motions in the following verse.
6: If the two aspects of coming to pass (are admitted), then there follow two kinds of passing (i.e. transpiring) entities. For, a passing away which is devoid of a passing entity does not take place.
This verse pursues the implications of the previous one, stating that if there are two movements then there must be two movers because movement is not appropriate when separated from a mover. It is not possible to say that both motions share the same mover as their subjects. One might make this argument based upon the observation that a person can engage in multiple activities simultaneously such as walking and talking. Would there not thus be two movements in one mover? But an object, in this case a human, is not the agent of the activity. Rather, the exertion by which the activity is accomplished is the agent, and the exertion which effects talking is different than the exertion which effects walking. Thus, the agents are not the same, so the movers cannot be the same. If the two motions had the same subject, the mover and the motion would be identical, and this is absurd. Therefore, in attempting to explain the motion of one subject, the opponent is stuck with two movers. This is clearly the start of an infinite regress. For each of these movers must exhibit motion by nature of their being movers. Hence, there are now two motions which must be explained where at first there was only one. Tracing the same essentialist point of view again for these two motions, there will soon be four motions, and so on ad infinitum.
This verse makes clear Nagarjuna’s view regarding language: there is no dichotomy between entity and attribute. This conclusion is generalizable to change and to properties in general as entities which inhere in subjects.
7: If now the coming to pass which is devoid of a passed entity does not take place, then, in turn, where will the passing entity be without the coming to pass?
Nagarjuna has previously refuted the possibility of positing the existence of motion to prove the existence of a mover. If the opponenet tries to use the reverse argument that the mover can be observed, so movement must exist, Nagarjuna here refutes that. If a mover does not exist without motion, how could motion exist without a mover? A mover is not a base for establishing movement, rather it requires the other to exist. This has importance at the conventional level in the analysis of motion. Any analysis of either motion or mover which leaves the other out or does not recognize their interdependence will fail. This statement shows that neither motion nor mover can be established as the basis for the other. Of course, all of these refutations apply only if one holds a substantialist view of inherent existence, for to exist inherently is to exist independently. If however, you do not separate the two concepts as the essentialists do, then you encounter no problem in explaining their existence as interdependent and lacking svahbhava.
8: Indeed, a passing entity does not come to pass and neither does a non-passing entity. Apart from these, how could there be a third (type of) entity coming to pass?
In verses 1-8 Nagarjuna has critiqued the concept of movement. Now he turns his attention to the concept of motion. The analysis will be parallel to that for movement. If a mover does not move (since a mover cannot do other than move) and non-mover does not move, there can be no other third entity which does move. Mover and non-mover, again, refer to “essential” entities. The context of this critique is slightly different than in verse 1 where Nagarjuna referred to the past, as in the moved entity or the not moved entity. For here, Nagarjuna refers to the moving entity in the present. Thus, he shows that essentialist views produce metaphysical interpretations not only in relation to the past and future but also in relation to the present.
Nagarjuna has argued that a thing in motion cannot be thought of as a thing whose nature it is to move. Clearly, we cannot think of a thing whose nature it is not to move as in motion. So if we think of motion as an attribute which is either compatible with an entity’s nature or is not, we must admit that motion cannot be found and must not exist. So we cannot explain ordinary motion with an essentialist point of view. This is emphasized again in the next two verses as well.
9: Indeed, how is it (possible) for a passing entity to come to pass when, separated from a coming to pass, a passing entity does not take place?
10: If it is asserted that a passing entity comes to pass then a fallacy would result in that the entity could be separated from the coming to pass. (And yet) a passing entity requires the (condition of) passing away.
The argument here is a the converse formulation of the argument in verse 4. To say that a mover moves is inappropriate because is it is inappropriate to speak of a mover without movement. The passing entity and coming to pass are inseparable, so it is not intelligent to speak of the former as exhibiting the latter, since it cannot do otherwise.
11: If again it is asserted that the passing entity comes to pass then (another) fallacy would result in two types of coming to pass. One type would exhibit the fact of a passing entity and the other the coming to pass in virtue of being a passing entity.
This verse recapitulates the argument in verse 5. The first movement is the one in virtue of which we call the mover as such. Then, a second movement would be required by which it moves. The second movement is the activity of motion that the mover (so named because of the first movement) carries out.
At this point, Nagarjuna changes his approach and disputes the inherent existence of motion by attacking the possibility of the beginning and ending of such motion.
12: There is no commencing of passing away in that which has transpired nor in that which has not transpired. Neither is there a commencement in the present passing away. Wherein, then, does it commence (to pass away)?
If you argue that motion exists because it commences, you are stuck with the thorny problem of identifying the time at which motion commences. Candrakirti again analyzes this argument in terms of the path of motion traversed. The commencement must begin either in the sector of path already traversed, in the sector not yet traversed, or in the sector just in traverse. It cannot begin in the sector traversed because that sector is devoid of motion. If movement commenced there, it would not be part of the sector already traversed since past and present are contraries. Neither can movement commence in the sector not yet traversed because future and present are contraries. Movement cannot commence in the sector just in traverse for that sector does not exist, as has been shown already.
In terms of time, since motion does not commence in an already moving object you must look elsewhere. Motion also does not commence in an object which is not moving because it is stationary. But once a thing is in motion, it is too late. Motion cannot always begin in the past or future, but then there is no duration to go anywhere in the present. This verse is a direct critique of the Abhidharma interpreters who analyzed existence in terms of discrete momentary events connecting past, present, and future, yet who were unable to account for the origin of each moment.
13: There is no present passing away prior to the commencement of coming to pass and also in that which has transpired. How could there be a commencement of coming to pass in that which has not transpired.
This is merely an alternate formulation of the refutation offere in verse 12. According to Kalupahana, the last line of this verse is a refutation of the “unmoved mover” at a microcosmic or phenomenal level.6 The Abidharma interpreters were probably aware of the Buddha’s reluctance to discuss the absolute origin of the universe. Yet, their analyses, especially their understanding of change as momentary destruction, left them with varying numbers of discrete moments in which each preceding moment had to account for the succeeding moment that is different. The Sautrantikas had four such discrete moments (i.e. origin, stasis, decay, and destruction), the Theravadins had only three (i.e. origin, stasis, and destruction), and the Sautrantikas held only origin and destruction.
14: As any form of the commencement of coming to pass cannot be seen, how could that which has transpired, the present passing away, and that which has not transpired be conceivable?
If no beginning of movement is observed, how can a tripartite path of movement be conceived based upon such a presupposition? This verse does not deny the existence of past, present, and future. What is denied is the validity of discriminations or thoughts regarding past, present, and future which are based on the conception of commencement of movement denied in the previous verses.
15: Indeed, the passing entity nor the non-passing entity does not abide. How could there be a third entity, besides these, that abides?
In verse 15, Nagarjuna begins a new tack, showing that all that has been said about motion applies likewise to its opposite, rest. Similarly, this argument can be interpreted as relating to stasis (permanence). Abide has an interesting double usage which is significant for the meaning of this verse. It can be interpreted as meaning to remain stationary, or it can be interpreted as meaning to come to a rest. Since non-motion is just the converse of motion it follows that it will be subject to the same activities, namely commencement and cessation. The subsequent verses critique both views, but the double meaning makes the arguments specifically clear.
Nagarjuna shows here that to say a non-mover is stationary is redundant. Thus to say that a non-mover rests implies that a non-mover could do otherwise. This is unacceptable, but so is the assertion that a mover rests since by nature a mover exhibits motion. To say that a mover comes to rest will be refuted in verse 17. But equally wrong is the assertion that a non-mover comes to rest since it is by nature at rest. What would be the purpose of its coming to rest a second time? This view produces the same infinite regress as for motion. In virtue of one “coming to rest” an entity is a non-mover, and in virtue of a second she is “at rest.” This, of course, necessitates the existence of two resting entities. There is no third body apart from a mover and a non-mover, as pointed out earlier.
16: Indeed, how is it (possible) for a passing entity to abide when, separated from a coming to pass, a passing entity does not take place?
This verse supports the previous argument. If you say that it is the mover who abides by virtue of coming to rest, this is unacceptable because in the absence of movement a mover is not such. If a non-moving entity were a mover because of its inherent nature, then there could not be motion as the opposite of rest. Hence, to say a mover comes to rest is unintelligble. A mover without motion would be like an entity without characteristics.
17: There is no abiding (nature) in the present passing away, in that which has transpired and that which has not transpired. Coming to pass, commencement, and cessation are the same as for (the concept of) passage.7
The cessation of motion is the commencement of rest. Thus, all that applies to commencement applies to cessation. Like the commencement of motion in verse 12, Nagarjuna shows that the cessation of motion also cannot be located temporally according to a conception based on discrete moments of time. This refutes the possible assertion that movement exists because it ceases.
The second half of the verse concludes this section of Nagarjuna’s dialectic. He has shown that movement and its commencement and cessation are all comparable to motion, that is, motion/stasis and commencement/cessation cannot be expressed unless viewed as interdependently originating.
Inada and Streng commit an error in translating this line of the text. Both incorrectly interpreted the last line as being an unacceptable consequence (the identity of distinct phenomena) of a view of inherent existence. Streng renders the last line as, “For then the act of going [would be] origination while the ‘process of going to’ would be the same as cessation.”8 (Brackets in original.) There are four terms in the last line; he groups the first and second together and the third and fourth together as identical if one holds an inherent view of existence. Inada groups all four together as identical: “(Otherwise) the coming to pass, arising, and cessation would be identical with (the concept of) passage.”9 However, Kalupahana, Sprung, and Garfield all render this sentence as saying that movement, commencement, and cessation are all the same as for motion. This is the correct meaning of the verse.
According to Candrakirti, this line enables Nagarjuna to block a potential move by his opponent to assume the existence of movement in order to establish the existence of rest, and then use the existence of rest so established to establish the existence of movement. This argument is blocked because Nagarjuna states that rest, the term used to establish movement, is the same as motion, meaning it suffers from the same fallacies and unacceptable implications. By then rewording verse 15 (“the passing entity does not abide....”) as “the abiding entity does not come to pass,” and so on, movement is rejected as was motion. Similarly, the commencement of rest and the cessation of motion can be refuted.
This rendering of the verse is further supported by Nagarjuna’s dialectical method. Thus far, whenever Nagarjuna has stated an implication such as this one (i.e. an “otherwise....” clause), it has been succeeded by several lines examining the implication from the standpoint of “if it were not true that....” In this instance, if Nagarjuna had intended the “otherwise” construction, he would have followed this verse with another showing that if the concepts were not held as identical it would lead to a conclusion contradictory to his opponent’s original position. However, he does not. Instead, he proceeds into his concluding denial of movement and mover. Hence, it must be assumed that this statement is intended to summarize and extend the point he has just made regarding motion in order to show that it applies equally to the cessation and commencement of motion and to movement.
18: It is not justifiable to say that the coming to pass is the same as the passing entity; nor is it justifiable to say that the passing entity is different from or alien to passsage.
In this verse, Nagarjuna makes a new move, here disproving an inherent view of motion by showing that motion and mover cannot be conceived of as either the same or different. The first two lines of this verse attack the Sarvastivadins who tried to respond to the consequences raised thus far by asserting the identity of substance and attribute “on the basis of an eternal substance (svabhava), thereby rendering the attribute (laksana) an ephimeral [sic] or impermanent come-and-go entity.”10 The second two lines criticize the Sautrantikas who responded by “emphasizing difference (anya eva), thereby denying the substance and accepting fleeting and momentary flashes of attributes without any real connections.”11 Nagarjuna provides reasons for these rejections in the following verses.
19: If the coming to pass is identical with the passing entity, then (analogically) it would be the same as falling into the error of imputing a single character to the doer and [her] deed.
This verse describes the unacceptable conclusion of holding motion and mover as inherently existent and identical. In this case, the actor and the action would be identical, as in the cutter and the cutting. This is a ridiculous view because the agent would become distinct each time she performed another act. There would therefore be no basis for identifying people or things across time.
20: Again, if it is discriminatively thought that the passing entity is distinct from passage, then perhaps the passing entity could exist without a coming to pass and vice versa.
This alternative is equally unacceptable to Nagarjuna’s opponent since it implies that motion could exist without mover and vice versa. There is no empirically sound explanation, then, which can allow for motion and mover to exist essentially and independently of each other. According to Garfield, “Motion can only be understood in relation to movers-as a relation between their positions at different times. Movers can only be understood in relation to motion so understood.”12 But an understanding such as this does not reify motion and movers as entities, and thus it escapes the dilemma of their identity or difference.
21: As they (i.e. coming to pass and a passing entity) cannot possibly be established in terms of a single character nor of a different character, how could they be established at all?
We must read “established” in this verse as meaning established as existent entities. We then see that Nagarjuna is refuting here the possibility of proving substance and attribute as distinct, independently existent entities. However, an understanding of substance and attribute as interdependent (as empty of inherent existence) avoids the problems pointed out thus far. Nagarjuna does not make any counter-assertion, and thus he does not adopt a position which can be proved or disproved. This is an important point which shows that Nagarjuna’s viewpoint is not nihilistic. Because positive existence (bhava) is shown to be unfounded does not provide reason to assert the negation or destruction (abhava) of it. This position would also be unfounded based on Nagarjuna’s statements. For, as we have seen repeatedly, Nagarjuna only critiques the existence of essential entities, those that are held to be independently existent.
22: The passing entity which is known or described by passage does not initiate the latter because it cannot exist prior to the latter. Yet, any entity somehow does come to pass.
Here Nagarjuna points out that an entity cannot be the agent by which it moves because it did not exist as such prior to moving. Kalupahana renders this verse as, “[A mover] does not move by that motion [in terms of which a mover is spoken of].”13 If you speak of an independent mover, then motion is attributed to it and must precede its existence as a mover. This is not possible, for again we would have two motions as in verse 11: 1) one by which it is spoken of as a mover and 2) one by which it moves. But no mover exists prior to movement, so these cannot exist independently. Here again we see Nagarjuna’s affirmation that entities do somehow come to pass. He asserts that entities do come to pass except as they are conceived of as independent.
23: The passing entity which is known or described by passage does not initiate a different kind of passage because in a single coming to pass there cannot possibly be two kinds of passage.
If you say that the mover carries out another motion which is different than the one by which it is called a mover, you are wrong because you cannot have two motions as there is only one mover. Neither two movers nor two motions are present. So what moves? Garfield states, “What moves is the mover who is a mover in virtue of his motion (which is a motion in virtue of its being carried out by a mover).”14 This is the interdependent understanding of motion in which neither the mover nor the motion has an intrinsic identity, and both are empty of inherent existence.
24: The real state of a passing entity does not initiate three kinds of coming to pass nor does its unreal state.
25: Both the real and unreal states (of the passing entity) do not initiate three kinds of coming to pass; therefore there are no passage, passing entity, and that which is to be transpired.
According to Inada, the three kinds of coming to pass here refer to those involved in 1) real state, 2) unreal state, and 3) both real and unreal state. The real state means an inherently existing mover. The unreal state refers to an inherently existing non-mover. The third state refers to an inherently existing entity which both moves and does not move or neither moves nor does not move. (Since the converse of “both moving and non-moving” would be “neither resting nor non-resting,” and since Nagarjuna has already shown us that these arguments apply mutatis mutandis to rest by nature of being the opposite of motion, being both a mover and non-mover would in fact be an identical state of existence as being neither.) Nagarjuna is here summarizing the arguments which have been laid out before, forming a 3 by 3 matrix with each possible position refuted as shown below:
| Agent: | Inherently existing (mover) |
Inherently existing (non-mover) |
Inherently existing (both mover and non-mover or neither) |
| Performs: | |||
| Inherently existing (motion) |
Does not exist. | Does not exist. | Does not exist. |
| Inherently existing (non-motion) |
Does not exist. | Does not exist. | Does not exist. |
| Inherently existing (motion and non-motion or neither) |
Does not exist. | Does not exist. | Does not exist. |
Garfield states that the three states refer to the conditions of past, present, and future. While the matrix formed by this conception of the states would certainly be in accord with the one above, it would be a subset of it and would not exhaust all of the possible conceptions which Nagarjuna has refuted. It is crucial to the success of Nagarjuna’s dialectic that all of the possible positions which rely upon an inherently existing conception of motion and mover are shown to be unacceptable.
Emptiness
Having exhausted the possible objections of his opponent, Nagarjuna concludes that “there are no passage, passing entity, and that which is to be transpired.” It is important to understand this statement in terms of the matrix of views which have been refuted. Nagarjuna is stating that motion and movers do not exist as conceived of by his opponent; he does not assert a static ultimate reality in which they do not exist at all. For one thing, this would be an incompatible view since he endorses the basis of any Buddhist philosophical system (interdependent origination and change) in the opening chapter. It is unfounded to assume a view of negation (abhava) based on the unfoundedness of inherent existence (bhava). Nagarjuna “proceeds along the middle way empty of extremes towards his intangible goal.”15 That goal is a view of reality based upon interdependent origination.
Thus, Murti’s summary of this chapter is misleading when he states, “Being relative to each other neither of them is real. Nagarjuna therefore reaches the conclusion: that motion, mover and space are but appearance.”16 This is not at all what Nagarjuna intends as his conclusion. This chapter, read in the context of the first chapter, repeatedly supports a view that motion exists conventionally and dependently, as in verses 4, 12, and 22 when Nagarjuna states that nonetheless, conventional aspects of motion can be empirically observed to exist. The non-existence Nagarjuna speaks of in this chapter is the lack of existence as substantial entities only. This actually recovers existence from the brink of destruction, since independent entities could do nothing at all and could not act as either condition or consequence, motion or mover.
What emerge then are not entities but relations. Motion, as stated before, can exist only as the relation between the positions of a body over time and is thus dependent upon that body and those positions. Moreover, motion emerges as a conventional entity which we can identify and speak of only to the extent that we make the decision to identify an object which differs from another only by position over time as the same object. Thus, Nagarjuna shows us that we must recognize conventions as the base of ontology and not vice versa. Irregardless of our descriptions of it, the reality remains such as it is: non-conceptual and indescribable.
References
1 Streng, Frederick J. Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning. Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1967, P. 139.
2 Garfield, Jay L. The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamika-karika. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1995, P. 126.
3 Sprung, Mervyn. Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way: The Essential Chapters from the Prasannapada of Candrakirti. Boulder, CO: Prajña Press, 1979, P. 76.
4 Inada, Kenneth K. Nagarjuna: A Translation of his Mulamadhyamikakarika with an Introductory Essay. Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1970, P. 43.
5 Garfield, P. 126.
6 Kalupahana, David J. Nagarjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1986, P. 125.
7 The second sentence is the author’s modification of Inada’s translation to correct a perceived error.
8 Streng, P. 186.
9 Inada, P. 48.
10 Kalupahana, P. 128.
11 Ibid.
12 Garfield, P. 132.
13 Kalupahana, P. 130.
14 Garfield, P. 132.
15 Lindtner, Chr. Master of Wisdom: Writings of the Buddhist Master Nagarjuna. Oakland, CA: Dharma Press, 1986, P. 258.
16 Murti, T. R. V. The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. London: George Allen and Unwin (Publishers) Ltd., 1955, P. 183.